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I. INTRODUCTION 
The evolution of corporate governance in Japan towards interna-
tional standards continues, though at a gradual pace that often concerns 
outsiders.
1
 The substance of Japanese corporate governance is often 
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questioned due to a lack of understanding of the unique elements of the 
Japanese institutional system. Japanese companies are under a sustained 
assault from overseas investors to introduce a greater number of inde-
pendent directors on boards, improve accountability, and enhance trans-
parency.
2
 The majority of Japanese companies have taken what they re-
gard as significant steps in this direction of accountability. In Japan, 
however, there is a different conception of the role of the board, the 
function of corporate governance, and the purpose of the corporation.
3
 
This Article will argue that significant changes in these enduring Japa-
nese corporate values and practices can only be accomplished if a more 
convincing theory and model of the corporation is proposed. In important 
respects, the contemporary evolution of corporate governance in Japan 
reflects the fundamental dilemmas inherent in defining corporate purpose 
first recognized by Berle and Means. 
II. THE CHANGING ROLES OF BOARDS AND DIRECTORS IN JAPAN 
External perceptions of Japanese corporate governance often focus 
on a lack of board independence with few outside directors, insufficient 
disclosure, prevalent cross-shareholdings, and persistent instances of 
corporate fraud and scandals. On the contrary, the duties of directors 
were tested in Japan as the structure of share ownership changed and 
governance reforms were introduced: significant corporate disclosure is 
now occurring and independent directors are being appointed. The future 
of corporate governance in Japan lies in how the relationships between 
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companies and shareholders develop, the role of directors and investors 
are conceived, and the ultimate purpose of the corporation defined. 
In addition to full board members, Japanese companies also appoint 
kansayakus who are Audit and Supervisory Board Members performing 
a role similar to audit committees and are becoming more outspoken.
4
 
Table 1 shows a comparison of the composition of board membership in 
companies from the Tokyo Stock Exchange in the Nikkei 225 Index be-
tween 1998 and 2013.
5
 While the number of directors is decreasing, the 
proportion of outside directors is increasing, as is the number of inde-
pendent outside kansayakus. This is a reflection of the changing role of 
boards in Japan, which were traditionally regarded as a managerial bod-
ies rather than supervisory organs. 
Table 1: Board Membership of Nikkei 225 Index
6
 
 1998   2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 
Directors 25.1     17.9 13.6 12.1 11.4 10.9 
Of Whom Are Outside Directors 0.2 0.7 1.0 1.4 1.9 2.3 
Kansayakus 4.2 4.2 4.1 4.3 4.3 4.2 
Of Whom Are Outside Kansayakus 1.3 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.6 2.6 
Ratio of Outside Board  
Members (%) 
5.3 12.9 18.5 24.3 28.7 32.5 
Table 2: Professional Background of Outside Directors
7
 
 Directors/Kansayakus 
From Other Companies 62.6 % 
Attorney-at-Law 16.1% 
CPA / Tax Accountant 13.6% 
Academic and Others 7.7% 
From Major Shareholders 19.2% 
From Banks 11.1% 
From Government Bureaus 1.9% 
                                                 
 4. Details on Kansayaku can be found on the website of About Corporate Auditor, JAPAN 
AUDIT & SUPERVISORY BOARD MEMBERS ASS’N (Mar. 11, 2007), http://www.kansa.or.jp/en/ 
About_Corporate_Auditor.pdf. 
 5. TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., TSE-LISTED COMPANIES WHITE PAPER ON CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 2013 (2013) [hereinafter 2013 TSE-LISTED COMPANIES WHITE PAPER], available at 
http://www.tse.or.jp/rules/cg/white-paper/b7gje60000005ob1-att/b7gje6000003ukm8.pdf.  
 6. Id.  
 7. Id. 
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While Japanese company boards remain heavily dominated by in-
side executive directors, the number of outside directors is increasing in a 
process of professionalization. As Table 2 reveals, Japanese companies 
are assembling significant numbers of lawyers, accountants, and aca-
demics as board members, most of whom are drawn from the ranks of 
major shareholders, banks, and government bureaus. A critical mass of 
external directors is gathering, who are reinforced by kansayakus. In ad-
dition, the kansayakus, while remaining non-voting board members, are 
becoming increasingly active and visible. 
To analyze the recent development of corporate governance in Ja-
pan, we would like to explore the series of amendments to Japanese 
commercial law by focusing on the revision of the roles of directors and 
kansayakus.8 Japanese commercial law was first introduced at the end of 
the nineteenth century and was modeled after German stock corporation 
law. The underlying concepts of Japanese corporate law are similar to 
those in other major industrial economies, including the independence 
and separation implicit in corporate personality. Shareholders own the 
securitized assets of the company in shares and have a residual claim in 
the company. Directors are appointed by the shareholders to look after 
the company’s assets and serve the best interest of the company. Duties 
of directors are interpreted similarly to Western corporate practice in a 
duty of care, duty to avoid conflicts of interest, and duty of loyalty. A 
series of corporate scandals, fraud cases, and the increasing litigation 
from shareholders recently tested these duties because of tensions over 
responsibilities for financial statements and internal control in the devel-
opment of hostile bid and takeover defense measures.
9
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 8. An English translation of Japanese company law is available at Small and Medium-Sized 
Cooperative Act, JAPANESE L. TRANSLATION, http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/det 
ail/?printID=&ft=1&re=02&dn=1&ky=company+law&x=47&y=13&co=01&page=3&vm=04 (last 
visited Oct. 21, 2013). 
 9. Mark D. West, Why Shareholders Sue: The Evidence from Japan (Mich. Law & Econ. Re-
search Paper No. 00-010, 2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
251012. 
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Figure 1: Corporate Governance in Japan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A century after the implementation of the essential elements that 
constitute Japanese company law, the law still maintains some German 
characteristics, such as the appointment of corporate auditors or supervi-
sors in addition to directors. For larger companies listed on the stock ex-
change, shareholders elect an average of four kansayakus who form a 
board of kansayakus, officially translated as an Audit and Supervisory 
board (Figure 1). Kansayakus can serve up to four years, after which they 
can be re-elected. Their primary duties include supervising board mem-
bers and auditing financial statements alongside the independent auditor. 
They attend board meetings and are encouraged to speak. Unlike their 
director colleagues, however, kansayakus have no voting rights for deci-
sions at the board meetings. Because of the existence of kansayakus, di-
rectors can concentrate on daily management and execution of business 
matters. 
Central elements of Japanese company law underwent major 
changes after 1945 when, under U.S. direction, attempts were made to 
enhance the role of the board of directors with the introduction of a duty 
of loyalty. In Japan, however, because of the inherited German du-
al-board concept, the function of the board of directors essentially re-
mained the performance of executive duties. Directors were expected to 
be engaged full time in company affairs and participate in daily business 
conduct. Although they were liable by law to monitor each other, in real-
ity, it is unlikely that they would ever express negative views on their 
“bosses” who were by law defined as “representative directors.” The 
board itself contained the pyramidal hierarchical structure, which was 
regarded as an impediment to the monitoring function it was expected to 
Shareholders Meeting 
Kansayaku-kai (Audit 
and Supervisory Board) 
Board of Directors 
(Torishimariyaku-kai) 
Independent 
Auditor 
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perform. With the strong postwar recovery and growth of the Japanese 
economy, the voice of the board of directors became increasingly pow-
erful, while the role of the corporate auditor–supervisory board remained 
weak. 
After the Second World War, the Germans were under pressure to 
democratize their major corporations; they amended their own stock 
corporation law by the mid-twentieth century to empower the superviso-
ry board together with the introduction of workers’ representation. The 
Japanese, however, did not follow suit. The strong postwar performance 
by Japanese companies was often overshadowed by a series of corporate 
scandals and wrongdoings. Examples include illegal pollution and an 
avoidable major nuclear accident due to poor risk management;
10
 brib-
ery of politicians and bureaucrats; illegal payments to corporate racket-
eers (popularly known as sokaiya); and numerous cases of false descrip-
tions on company reports.
11
 The commercial law was revised every few 
years to deal with the wrongdoings by enhancing the powers and author-
ity of the kansayakus. This reform reached its peak in 2005 when the law 
made it mandatory for the audit–supervisory board of larger companies 
to select at least half of its members from outside the company. 
The tide changed towards the end of 1990, following the earlier 
bursting of the speculative bubble. When the Japanese economy gradu-
ally ran out of steam, people started to wonder if boards of directors con-
sisting mainly of insiders were capable of responding effectively to a 
slowing economy and changing business environment. The focus of 
Japanese corporate governance shifted from the kansayakus to the direc-
tors. New pressures were also felt from outside Japan as overseas inves-
tors, including the California Public Employees’ Retirement System 
(CalPERS), became increasingly active investors in Japanese corpora-
tions. Those overseas investors were quick to notice the main impairment 
to the Japanese board: the universal lack of external representation. 
A working group on company law (Modernization of Company 
Law) was formed in 2002 by the consultative body of the Ministry of 
Justice, which proposed a series of reforms of Japanese company law. 
These reforms included major revisions to the commercial code, limited 
liability company law, and audits of public companies. The Moderniza-
                                                 
 10 . See generally THE NATIONAL DIET OF JAPAN, FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR ACCIDENT 
INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION COMN’N, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2012). 
 11. Matt Nichol, Japanese Corporate Governance and the Market for Corporate Information 
Disclosure: What Is the Role of Private Rights Enforcement?, 27 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 262, 263 (2013).
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tion of Company Law was assembled into a corporation law that was 
passed by the Japanese Diet on June 29, 2005, and came into effect on 
May 1, 2006.
12
 Takahashi and Shimizu identify the central purposes of 
the reforms as: 
1. Securing the realization of corporate governance; 
2. Establishing an intelligible law for an information age; 
3. Improving disclosure and fundraising measures; 
4. Adapting company law to the internationalization of corporate 
activity; 
5. Consolidating and making coherent the company law.13 
 
The reforms were followed by the Financial Instruments and Exchange 
Law that came into effect in September 2007, which replaced the Securi-
ties and Exchange Law, and provided a statutory framework of merger 
and acquisition activities with provisions for public offerings of securi-
ties, takeover bids, and insider trading.
14
 
The first practical initiative came in 2002 when revision of the 
commercial law allowed Japanese companies to select alternative models 
of corporate governance: either maintain the traditional system with 
kansayakus or switch to a three-committee system (audit, nomination, 
and compensation committees) in which the majority of members of each 
committee must be outside directors. The alternative model—the 
three-committee system—went further and required companies to ap-
point a CEO with extensive authority to represent the company. Subse-
quently, this initiative and other corporate governance reforms were 
consolidated into a new Corporations Act. Despite initial enthusiasm for 
these proposals, the number of companies that switched to the alternative 
system remained very low (see Table 3). Several reasons are cited, in-
cluding a lack of flexibility in the governance traditions and arrange-
ments of Japanese corporations, and strong reservations among company 
presidents towards handing their power to CEOs. 
                                                 
 12. Eiji Takahashi & Madoka Shimizu, The Future of Japanese Corporate Governance: The 
2005 Reform, 19 J. JAPANESE L. 35, 36 (2005). 
 13. See id. 
 14. See generally HIROKI KODATE & RISA FUKUDA, MERGER AND ACQUISITION REVIEW 257 
(Simon Robinson ed., 2d ed. 2008), available at http://www.amt-law.com/en/pdf/bulletins3_pdf/ 
111129_1.pdf. 
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Table 3: Company Ownership and Board Structure Nikkei 225 Index
15
 
 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 
Ratio of Overseas  
Shareholding (%) 
14.1  17.5 21.5 27.3 24.2 24.9
16
 
Companies Adopting 
Committee Model 
0.0 0.0 5.1 5.1 5.4 6.5 
Companies With Takeover 
Defense Mechanisms 
0.0 0.0 0.0 27.2 26.7 30.4 
        
However slowly, the momentum to make Japanese company boards 
more independent continues with the company law review recommenda-
tions for the nomination of outside directors and the Tokyo Stock Ex-
change requiring the appointment of at least one independent direc-
tor/kansayaku. There continues to be insistent pressure from institutional 
shareholders, with the Japanese Pension Fund Association encouraging 
the appointment of outside directors in the companies they invest in and 
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) recommending negative votes 
for companies without external directors. 
Meanwhile, other important developments influenced changes in 
Japanese corporate governance. One development is the simplification of 
the procedures associated with filing derivative suits. For example, in 
1993, an amendment reduced the fee required to file such a suit to 8,200 
yen. The 2001 Enron bankruptcy and new sets of rules over directors’ 
responsibilities regarding financial statements also made existing direc-
tors increasingly aware of the extent of their responsibilities. In order to 
improve the quality of financial statements in Japanese companies, there 
is a limit to what independent directors and kansayakus can do, and it has 
become necessary for everyone involved in financial reporting to coor-
dinate their efforts to produce more accurate and reliable accounts.
17
  
 
                                                 
 15. 2013 TSE-LISTED COMPANIES WHITE PAPER , supra note 5. 
 16. Id. 
 17. With reference to Olympus, a very thorough investigatory report was published. See 
OLYMPUS CORP. THIRD PARTY COMM., INVESTIGATION REPORT (2011), available at 
http://www.olympus-global.com/en/common/pdf/if111206corpe_2.pdf. 
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Table 4: Distribution of Share Ownership in Japan 1950–201018 
Year 
 
Government Banks Insurance, 
Pensions 
& Trusts 
Non- 
Financial 
Corps. 
Overseas Individuals Total 
1950 3.1 12.6 11.9 11.0 0.0 61.3 100 
1960 0.2 30.6 3.7 17.8 1.3 46.3 100 
1970 0.6 13.7 19.2 23.9 4.9 37.7 100 
1980 0.4 17.5 22.2 26.2 5.8 27.9 100 
1990 0.3 20.9 23.8 30.1 4.7 20.4 100 
2000 0.2 19.2 20.6 21.8 18.8 19.4 100 
2010 0.3 14.7 16.8 21.2 26.7 20.3 100 
 
III. THE IMPACT OF THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF SHAREHOLDINGS IN 
JAPANESE CORPORATIONS 
As with other countries, the structure of shareholdings in Japan has 
changed substantially over time.
19
 The percentage of shares owned by 
individuals has gradually diminished from 61.3% in 1950 to 20.3% in 
2010, while the percentage of shares held by banks, insurance, and pen-
sion funds has varied from decade to decade, reflecting changes in finan-
cial market conditions though remaining a significant presence. Subject 
to a series of regulatory efforts to diminish the importance of 
cross-holding of shares, the proportion of non-financial corporations’ 
cross-holdings of shares has been substantially reduced but remains sig-
nificant.
20
 The most critical transformation of share ownership in Japan, 
however, has been the increase of overseas ownership from 0% in 1950 
to 26.7% in 2010. This is of immense significance for an industrial 
economy that was once typified by resolute insularity. Now, in contrast, 
the internationalization of the ownership shares in Japan exceeds that of 
the United States (12.7%) and many other European economies including 
Germany (22%) (Table 5). 
                                                 
 18. 2013 TSE-LISTED COMPANIES WHITE PAPER, supra note 5. 
 19. See Table 4. 
 20. Hideaki Miyajima, The Unwinding of Cross-Shareholding in Japan: Causes, Effects, and 
Implications, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ORGANIZA-
TIONAL DIVERSITY, supra note 3, at 77, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=818346. 
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Table 5: Share Ownership of Major Economies Compared (2010)
21
 
 Japan U.S. U.K. Germany France 
Government or Local 
Government 
6.2 - 2.9 2.3 8.7 
Banks and Financial 
Institutions 
9.0 - 18.0 3.8 19.0 
Insurance and Trusts 14.9 47.8 21.9 19.8 1.1 
Non-Financial  
Corporations 
22.9 - 2.2 41.0 21.1 
Overseas 26.7 12.7 40.0 22.0 38.7 
Individuals 20.3 39.5 15.0 11.0 11.5 
 
The changing shareholding structure over the last two decades had 
a significant impact on the governance of Japanese corporations. The 
impact of changing shareholding structures is twofold: first, pressure 
from untraditional and unfriendly shareholders threatening the control of 
the company; and secondly, demands from institutional shareholders, 
both domestic and overseas, calling for better corporate governance.
22
 
Together these forces amount to a challenge to the traditional corporate 
security of the Keiretsu shareholdings systems. Horizontal Keiretsu (such 
as Mitsubishi, Sumitomo-Mitsui, and Mizhuo), which revolve around a 
major bank and have cross-holding of shares between different industrial 
members of the group of companies, and vertical Keiretsu (in major in-
dustries such as automobiles, large engineering, and retail with parent 
companies owning shares in suppliers and distributors) were both de-
signed to defend the Keiretsu members from external influence. Share-
holdings were seen as the means of maintaining supportive relationships 
and not to be used primarily for profit-taking or dividend payments. 
While traditional Keiretsu inter-corporate shareholdings were un-
wound in recent years, the domestic pension and insurance funds share-
holders have remained largely passive. In contrast, investment companies 
with domestic and overseas clients became more active in corporate 
governance.
23
 The new overseas owners of shares in Japanese corpora-
                                                 
 21. See Share Ownership—Share Register Survey Report, 2010, OFF. NAT’L STAT. (Feb. 28, 
2012), http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/pnfc1/share-ownership---share-register-survey-report/2010/ind 
ex.html (U.K.). 
 22. Curtis J. Milhaupt, In the Shadow of Delaware? The Rise of Hostile Takeovers in Japan, 
105 COLUM. L. REV. 2171 (2005). 
 23. See generally Michael A. Witt, Japan: Coordinated Capitalism Between Institutional 
Change and Structural Inertia, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ASIAN BUSINESS SYSTEMS ch. 6 
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tions, including U.S. and European pension funds and investment com-
panies, other short-term investors such as hedge funds, and sover-
eign-wealth funds investment from newly industrialized countries, have 
begun to challenge company management directly. A critical inflection 
point was reached as overseas shareholders secured a larger proportion of 
shares than the non-financial corporate cross-holdings of shares between 
Japanese corporations themselves.
24
 These overseas activists are being 
joined by Japanese pension, insurance, and investment companies, ques-
tioning the corporate governance standards of Japanese corporations. 
 
Figure 2: The Transformation of Japanese Shareholding: Company 
Cross-holdings and Overseas Shareownership 1985–200725 
       *Domestic 
 
Japan is the first Asian economy to experience the full rigors of 
shareholder activism on an extensive scale, as most Asian countries are 
dominated by companies that are majority family owned, state owned, or 
state directed.
26
 In most Asian markets, including Indonesia, Thailand, 
the Philippines, and Korea, individuals and their families are the domi-
nant shareholders, often with relatives and their advisers acting as direc-
                                                                                                             
(Michael A. Witt & Gordon Redding eds., 2014), available at http://faculty.insead.edu/michael-witt/ 
documents/Witt_OUP_Japan_2013.pdf. 
 24. See Figure 2. 
 25. Michiyo Nakamoto & Kate Burgess, Dividends to Reap: Shareholder Activists Begin to 
Make Their Mark on Japan, FIN. TIMES (July 2, 2008), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ 
be842ae4-4863-11dd-a851-000077b07658.html#axzz2rRbXmJsA (data adapted from TOKYO 
STOCK EXCHANGE, FACT BOOK (2007), available at http://www.tse.or.jp/english/market/data/factbo 
ok/b7gje60000003o32-att/fact_book_2007.pdf). 
 26. See generally Richard W. Carney & Michael A. Witt, The Role of the State in Asian Busi-
ness Systems, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ASIAN BUSINESS SYSTEMS, supra note 23, at ch. 14. 
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tors on group company boards. In China, while family ownership and 
control is extensive, the dominant player remains the state, which often 
exercises determining influence over companies’ governance and strate-
gy, holding 83.1% of market capitalization in 2007. Finally, Asian coun-
tries have developed state investment vehicles that exercise an oversight 
function over state owned enterprises and other private sector invest-
ments, such as Temasek Holdings in Singapore, Khazanah Nasional in 
Malaysia, and the state-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission of the State Council in China.
27
 
Though family or state control remains prevalent throughout most 
of Asia, in the Japanese corporate sector, overseas superannuation, in-
surance and investment funds, together with hedge funds and other short 
terms investors, are having a major impact. Institutional investors are 
becoming more critical on corporate governance issues, and dissident 
private investors research the voting of institutions to leverage their ar-
gument and increase their support. Overall, most Japanese corporations 
retain significant support for management policy in voting at AGMs; 
however, the more critical voting patterns of institutional investors rep-
resents something of a sea-change in Japanese corporate governance.
28
 
 
Table 6: Voting Results at AGM: Votes Cast in Favor of         
Management Policy 2010 
 
 Votes By All 
Shareholders %
29
 
Votes By Institutional 
Shareholders %
30
 
All Agendas 95.4 81.2 
Election of Directors 95.4 76.4 
Election of Kansayakus 94.7 77.2 
Remuneration Packages 94.8 74.4 
Approving Takeover 
Defense Measures 
81.7 25.0 
Shareholder Proposals 22.6 7.7 
                                                 
 27. See generally OECD, REFORM PRIORITIES IN ASIA: TAKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TO 
A HIGHER LEVEL (2011), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/49801431.pdf. 
 28. See Table 6. 
 29. Toshikazu Nakanishi & Takaya Seki, Current Analysis of Corporate Governance in Japan 
2013, Bessatsu Shoji-Homu (Commercial Law Centre), Tokyo No. 378, June 10, 2013 (Japan). 
 30. Naoyoshi Ema, Sumitomo Mitsui Trust Bank, Voting by Institutional Shareholders 2012, 
Junkan Shoji-Homu (Commercial Law Review), Tokyo Issue No. 1984, Dec. 5, 2012 (Japan). 
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IV. CURRENT ISSUES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN 
Lessons are being learned from the incidents of accounting fraud 
and other corporate wrongdoing in Japan, as in the Kanebo, Seibu, and 
Olympus cases. Kanebo, a Japanese conglomerate, was involved in 
long-running accounting fraud; the revelation of collaboration in falsify-
ing accounting reporting between Kanebo executives and the auditor 
Chuo Aoyama (the Japanese arm of Pricewaterhouse Cooper) over a 
five-year period led to arrest of the executives of both the company and 
auditing firm, and the company was delisted.
31
 
Seibu Railway was delisted from the Tokyo Stock Exchange in 
2000 for falsifying financial statements. Seibu Holdings (with assets in-
cluding hotels, railways, and the Saitama Seibu Lions baseball team) 
pursued governance reforms to become a publicly traded company, but 
encountered opposition from Cerberus Capital Management, a U.S. pri-
vate equity firm that had taken a $1 billion stake in the company, be-
coming the largest shareholder with 32.4%. As Seibu prepared for relist-
ing in 2012, Cerberus became concerned about the low offer price for 
shares, and believed the company needed more time to improve the 
business before listing by terminating unprofitable lines. At this point, 
Seibu moved to sever formal ties with its largest investor, insisting Cer-
berus’s proposals lacked a long-term perspective and could undermine 
the corporate value of Kanebo, while Cerberus claimed it was not being 
informed about the proposed listing. Cerberus launched a hostile tender 
offer to increase its stake above 36% and appoint three new board mem-
bers. In April 2013, Cerberus attempted to raise the stake again, aiming 
for 45% control and eight new board members, including Dan Quayle, 
former U.S. Vice-President and chairman of Cerberus. Falling short with 
a 35.5% stake, Cerberus, with over one-third of the stock, had the power 
to veto future board proposals.
32
 
The classic corporate crimes identified in the past in Japan, such as 
widespread payments to racketeers and rank corruption, are diminishing. 
Now, all companies are encouraged to appoint at least one outside direc-
                                                 
 31. Shingo Numata & Fumiko Takeda, Stock Market Reactions to Audit Failure in Japan: The 
Case of Kanebo and Chuo Aoyama, 45 INT’L. J. ACCT. 175 (2010). 
 32. Ben McLannahan, Cerberus Capital Management Raises Stake in Seibu Holdings, FIN. 
TIMES (June 1, 2013, 4:47 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9238450c-cad0-11e2-82bc-00144fea 
b7de.html#axzz2f7X8pF8A. How this dispute revealed different orientations between U.S. private 
equity and Japanese corporate priorities is revealed in the Wall Street Journal’s Inside the Sei-
bu–Cerberus Fight, WSJ LIVE (May 30, 2013, 10:30 PM), http://live.wsj.com/video/inside-th 
e-seibu-cerberus-fight/76C46995-2764-42C0-8BCF-2D85AAE1B160.html#!76C46995-2764-42C0-
8BCF-2D85AAE1B160. 
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tor; if they do not, companies are required to state reasons justifying why 
they do not have any outside directors. Japanese corporate boards are 
beginning to demonstrate a degree of independence in their monitoring 
of companies, and this has often been driven by the influence of more 
active shareholders. Along with the arrival of shareholder activism, a 
more active capital market is developing in Japan. Japan was once typi-
fied by a lack of a merger and takeover market, and the complete absence 
of hostile takeovers. However, in a different finance and investment cli-
mate, the possibility of hostile takeovers in Japan has now become real. 
The most conspicuous case of an unfriendly shareholder trying to 
control a Japanese company occurred in 2005, when Livedoor, an ag-
gressive and highly acquisitive Japanese Internet service provider com-
pany, tried to seize control of Fuji Television through Nippon Broad-
casting. Nippon Broadcasting’s initial attempt to fend off Livedoor by 
issuing the country’s first “poison pill” with the intention of issuing new 
shares to reduce the stake of unfriendly shareholders was ruled inappro-
priate by the Tokyo District Court and the Appeals Court. The poison pill 
itself, however, was regarded as lawful, and subsequently a large number 
of companies adopted the measure.
33
 This widespread determination to 
protect corporations from what was perceived as hostile influence or 
takeovers became the target of criticism from not only those with the 
intention to control corporations, but also from institutional shareholders, 
both domestic and overseas, who believed such a measure would under-
mine the value of companies. 
Companies that adopted poison pills were generally required to up-
grade corporate governance structures and the independence of their 
boards to demonstrate their neutrality. Subsequently, the number of out-
side independent directors was increased. Also, the government, led by 
METI, laid down a new set of rules corporate directors must respect 
when their company becomes a target of a hostile building up of shares 
and they consider protecting the existing management. Without sufficient 
cases representing precedence in Japan, cases from Delaware courts are 
often studied to obtain guidance from the epicenter of the exercise of U.S. 
corporate law. 
                                                 
 33. Meanwhile Livedoor’s meteoric career (encompassing twenty-seven acquisitions in ten 
years) crashed to earth in fraud charges of share-price manipulation, with the collapse of its share 
price and prosecution of its senior executives, including the colourful Takafumi Horie, ultimately 
leading to the takeover of the company by the Korean web portal NHN at a knock-down price. This 
fraud and collapse led to the passage of the Japanese Financial Instruments and Exchange Act on 
June 14, 2006 (often called the J-SOX in reference to the U.S. Sarbanes–Oxley Act), which en-
hanced disclosure obligations and internal controls in public companies. 
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More recently, further instances of corporate governance failures 
have been exposed in Japan. Financial misconduct on a grand scale re-
vealed to have taken place at Olympus shone a bright light into a dark 
corner of Japanese corporate governance—a failure that was part of the 
“vortex of frantic efforts into which many companies were drawn when 
the bubble economy reached its peak.”34 By the mid-1990s, Olympus 
faced losses that reached 100 billion yen as a result of poor investments 
in financial assets during the bubble. Olympus transferred the financial 
assets on which the unrealized losses had occurred up to the end of 
March 2000 into multiple receiver funds at their book value.
35
 Starting 
in 2007, a small group of Olympus executives sought to dispose of the 
losses by supplying a total of 135 billion yen to eliminate the receiver 
funds, using methods that included the following: 
i) The acquisition of three domestic subsidiaries, Altis, News 
Chef, and Humalabo, from the receiver funds at inflated prices 
(amounting to approximately 72 billion yen); 
ii) The payment of advisory fees when Gyrus Group PLC was 
acquired (amounting to approximately 63 billion yen); 
iii) The treatment of ‘goodwill’ in connection with Gyrus and 
the three domestic subsidiaries in the accounts as assets.
36
 
 
In April 2011, the arrival of Michael Woodford, a long-standing 
British executive of Olympus, as CEO, president, and director of Olym-
pus, caused a crisis in the company. Woodford raised serious concerns 
about the lack of transparency in significant past transactions of Olympus, 
information he derived not from within the company, but from the Au-
gust 2011 edition of a journal, FACTA, in an article entitled, Olympus 
Reckless M & A Mystery of Huge Losses. In October, having not been 
able to secure an explanation from Olympus’s executives, Woodford sent 
                                                 
 34. With reference to the illicit transactions and fraudulent financial reporting at Olympus a 
very thorough investigatory report was published. See OLYMPUS CORP. THIRD PARTY COMM., supra 
note 17, at 178. 
 35. Olympus was anticipating a critical development in Japanese financial instruments: for-
merly valued at their book value at acquisition, market value accounting was to begin after April 
2000 that would have exposed the losses. 
 36. See OLYMPUS CORP., REBUILDING TRUST: THE FIRST 100 DAYS, at 5 (2012), available at 
http://www.olympus-global.com/en/common/pdf/csr_confidence_2012.pdf. For a time in early 2012, 
it appeared as if there had formed “a united ‘all Japan’ front to prevent Woodford and foreign insti-
tutional investors from any involvement in Olympus management.” Close-up on Olympus: A Cross-
road in Japanese Industrial History, NIKKEI BUS. DIGITAL (Jan. 6, 2012), http://business.nikkeibp.co. 
jp/article/eng/20120106/225854/. 
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a dossier on the Gyrus acquisition to Pricewaterhouse Cooper, who re-
sponded that it was possible that illegal acts had taken place and directors 
had violated their duty of loyalty. Later in October, a special meeting of 
Olympus’s board of directors was called, and Woodford was dismissed 
from his post and fled the country, which provoked media reports ques-
tioning the illicit transactions and aroused investor concerns.
37
 
In November 2011, an independent inquiry by a group of distin-
guished lawyers confirmed in a thorough report that past losses had been 
concealed and acquisitions employed to eliminate these losses.
38
 The 
committee made recommendations for improved governance and ac-
countability of the company, and Olympus formed committees to reform 
the management of the company and to investigate director liability for 
the losses in December 2011. 
On December 21, 2011, the Japanese Securities and Exchange 
Commission and police began a criminal investigation of Olympus. In 
January 2012, Olympus filed suits with the Tokyo District Court, seeking 
to establish the liability of directors and auditors of Olympus, and the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange imposed a penalty of 10 million yen on Olympus 
for a listing agreement violation. In March 2012, the Tokyo District 
Prosecutors Office filed charges that Olympus violated both the Securi-
ties and Exchange Act and the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act 
for fraudulent financial reporting. A special general meeting of Olympus 
shareholders convened in April 2012, at which a new team of Olympus 
managers was appointed and all members of the old team resigned.
39
 
The Olympus Corporation Third Party Committee Report conclud-
ed that Olympus had resorted to financial engineering to disguise its 
losses while the majority of leading companies at the time returned to 
their core business and amended their balance sheets to reflect the actual 
financial status of the company. The senior executives and president of 
Olympus carried out the illicit transactions in secret, and there was no 
risk management system at Olympus that could detect this. 
Top management had put in place a one-man system over a long 
time, and an atmosphere was cultivated in which objections were 
not allowed to be spoken. Past Presidents had little awareness of 
                                                 
 37. See generally MICHAEL WOODFORD, EXPOSURE: INSIDE THE OLYMPUS SCANDAL—HOW I 
WENT FROM CEO TO WHISTLEBLOWER 5 (Portfolio Penguin, London 2012). 
 38. OLYMPUS CORP., supra note 36; Simon C.Y. Wong, Olympus Turmoil Shows Independent 
Oversight Is Critical at Japanese Firms, HARV. BUS. REV. BLOG NETWORK (Oct. 21, 2011, 12:55 
PM), http://blogs.hbr.org/cs/2011/10/olympus_turmoil_shows_independ.html. 
 39. OLYMPUS CORP., supra note 36. 
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transparency or governance. . . . A system for replacement of presi-
dents had not been established among the officers, so it had become 
possible to occupy the position arbitrarily. There was little openness, 
and a corporate environment where opinions could not be freely 
stated had been formed, so that among the officers, the attitude of 
personalizing the corporation had spread, and the sense of the duty 
of loyalty to the shareholders was weak. In actuality, the mindset of 
the officers had become stunted to the extent that the management 
and transfer of an enormous amount of funds and the incurring of 
enormous losses were not perceived to be issues.
40
 
In this instance, all of the relevant bodies under the Companies Act 
had failed in their duties including the board of directors, auditors, the 
board of auditors, and the auditing firm. The Third Party Report recom-
mended the replacement of all of the directors, executives, and auditors 
involved; the appointment of an independent external body to renew the 
governance of Olympus; and the changing of the unquestioning mindset 
of management.
41
 Whether this impetus may encourage a slight move 
from the traditional management model of the board’s role in Japan to-
wards a more monitoring role for boards remains to be seen.
42
 
V. RECENT GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES TO REVISE COMPANY LAW 
Aware of continuing concerns of both domestic and overseas in-
vestors regarding the fairness and transparency of Japanese financial 
markets, and the adequacy and independence of corporate governance, 
the Japanese government embarked on a new and ongoing campaign to 
transform institutions and practices. A corresponding report focused on 
three dimensions: (1) issues concerning capital raising policies; (2) 
structural aspects of corporate governance; and (3) issues on exercising 
voting rights.
43
 With reference to capital raising policies, a range of 
measures were proposed to protect minority shareholders, including full 
disclosure of third parties in financing and the review by statutory audi-
tors of any favorable terms. In addition, independent and stock exchange 
                                                 
 40. OLYMPUS CORP. THIRD PARTY COMM., supra note 17, at 180. 
 41. Id. at 183. 
 42. See generally Bruce E. Aronson, The Olympus Scandal and Corporate Governance Reform: 
Can Japan Find A Middle Ground Between the Board Monitoring Model and Management Model?, 
30 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 93 (2012). 
 43. See generally MINISTRY OF ECONOMY, TRADE AND INDUSTRY (METI), REPORT BY THE 
FINANCIAL SYSTEM COUNCIL’S STUDY GROUP ON THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF JAPANESE 
FINANCIAL AND CAPITAL MARKETS (2009) (Japan), available at http://www.fsa.go.jp/en/news/2009/ 
20090618-1/01.pdf. 
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examination of any issuance significantly diluting ownership of existing 
shareholders, changing the control of companies, or squeezing out 
shareholders was necessary. Further, clarification was required of the 
governance of corporate groups and of the relationships with subsidiaries, 
subsidiary listings, and cross shareholdings.
44
 
In regards to the structural aspects of corporate governance, the re-
port acknowledged that less than 3% of the Tokyo Stock Exchange listed 
companies had adopted the model of the company with committees and 
looked instead to increase the number of independent outside directors to 
one-third or one-half of the total (which matched the requirement by law 
that a majority of the auditors on the board of statutory auditors be ex-
ternal auditors). The report suggested strengthening the supervision of 
management by electing one of the independent outside directors to co-
ordinate the efforts of the board of statutory auditors and officers in 
charge of audit and internal control.
45
 The report also looked to institu-
tional investors to exercise their voting rights as part of their fiduciary 
duties and to disclose their voting guidelines and the results. The report 
called upon companies to disclose the ballot results at shareholder meet-
ings and to promote the use of electronic platforms to assist shareholders. 
Finally, the report required the stock exchanges to establish a framework 
to ensure the discipline of listed companies, to maintain high standards of 
corporate governance with an enhanced disclosure regime, and to con-
tinue discussions on improving company law.
46
 
As part of the response to these recommendations, the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange issued new Securities Listing Regulations and new Guidelines 
Concerning Listed Company Compliance.
47
 In 2010, depending on 
whether a firm had the kanasayaku statutory auditor system or the com-
mittee system, it became mandatory to have a minimum of one inde-
pendent auditor or director to protect shareholder interests.
48
 Indepen- 
dent directors were no longer allowed to have conflicts of interest, which 
                                                 
 44. See id. at 2. 
 45. Id. at 9–11. 
 46. Id. at 14–18. 
 47. TOKYO STOCK EXCH., INC., SECURITIES LISTINGS REGULATIONS (2011); TOKYO STOCK 
EXCH., INC., GUIDELINES CONCERNING LISTED COMPANY COMPLIANCE (2011). These regulations 
were updated in 2013: TOKYO STOCK EXCH. INC, SECURITIES LISTING REGULATIONS (2013) [here-
inafter 2013 SECURITIES LISTING REGULATIONS], available at http://www.tse.or.jp/english/ 
about/rules/b7gje600000044tu-att/securities_listing_regulations_2013-03-28-03-31.pdf; see also 
TOKYO STOCK EXCH., INC., GUIDELINES CONCERNING LISTED COMPANY COMPLIANCE (2012), 
available at http://www.tse.or.jp/english/about/rules/b7gje600000044tu-att/Guidelines_Concerning_ 
Listed_Company_Compliance_2012-05-10.pdf. 
 48. 2013 SECURITIES LISTING REGULATIONS, supra note 47, at 436–32. 
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excluded people from being independent who have a relationship with 
management or the firm, but no further definition of independence was 
offered. In addition, despite the common practice of interlocking boards, 
no company breached the director independence requirement, suggesting 
the requirement is not exacting.
49
 
Adopting the approach to independent director representation might 
seem minimalist to Anglo-American observers where in most jurisdic-
tions a majority of the board is normally required to be independent. Yet 
in Japan, these apparently small steps toward reform of corporate gov-
ernance are often interpreted as “undergoing dramatic change”50 because 
they seem to involve a substantial philosophical shift. The resistance of 
corporate Japan to independent outside directors is partially informed by 
concerns regarding whose interests they might serve and for what pur-
poses. While the Nikkei 225 companies move towards significant inde-
pendence on their boards, in 2010, 48% of Tokyo Stock Exchange listed 
companies still had only one independent director or auditor.
51
 By de-
fault, this reality now invests in the sole independent director or auditor 
in these companies some additional power, because if they were to resign, 
the company would be in breach of the stock exchange listing rules. 
The Japanese government wanted to see a strengthening of corpo-
rate governance in Japan, with mandatory outside directors on all listed 
companies, but encountering corporate resistance, it simply recom-
mended the stock exchange adopt the “comply or explain” principle in 
which companies without outside directors should explain to the market 
why they consider the practice appropriate. Meanwhile, government reg-
ulators continue to explore the potential role of independent directors in 
Japan and are examining how they might serve usefully in a monitoring 
role for investors and a performance role for the company without desta-
bilizing the companies concerned. 
The impact of foreign shareholders is reflected in many of the Jap-
anese policymakers’ initiatives. Instead of enhancing the roles of kan-
sayakus, the attempt was made to enhance the role of directors. The gov-
ernment first tried this in early 2000 but without much success. Among 
the reasons cited for the lack of development of directorial roles was that 
this was a voluntary measure, and no attempt was made to encourage 
                                                 
 49. See Nichol, supra note 11, at 276. 
 50. TOKYO STOCK EXCH., INC., TSE-LISTED COMPANIES WHITE PAPER ON CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 2011, at 84 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 TSE-LISTED COMPANIES WHITE PAPER], availa-
ble at http://www.tse.or.jp/english/listing/cg/b7gje60000003y6y-att/20110613.pdf 
 51 . TOKYO STOCK EXCH., INC., UPDATED CONSOLIDATED RESULTS OF INDEPENDENT 
DIRECTORS/AUDITORS NOTIFICATIONS 4 (2010). 
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companies to change. The second attempt, commencing in 2010, holds 
the promise to be gradually implemented, as every listed companies is 
now required to seriously consider if their corporate governance is ac-
ceptable to the new class of shareholders and stakeholders. 
VI. THE UNDERLYING CONCEPT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN 
A central explanation for the caution of Japanese companies re-
garding the reform of boards by introducing independent directors is a 
fundamental difference in Japan of the understanding of the underlying 
concept of corporate governance compared to Anglo-American compa-
nies. When asked by the Tokyo Stock Exchange to state in their annual 
reports their basic policies and objectives for corporate governance, 
“[m]any companies expressed that the objective of corporate governance 
is enhancement of corporate value.”52 For example, three explanations 
offered by different companies were: 
 The “[b]asic principle of corporate governance is to enhance 
efficiency and transparency of management and to maximize 
corporate value.”53 
 “We regard corporate governance as the key management issue 
to enhance corporate value as well as management transparency 
for shareholders.”54 
 “In order to continue to make profits from business activities 
and enhance corporate value, we consider it essential to develop 
corporate governance system as the framework to govern such 
activities.”55 
That “corporate value” did not at all equate with “shareholder value” in 
the minds of the respondents was demonstrated by the fact that only 
6.4% of companies stated that shareholder value was the essential pur-
pose of corporate governance (though the percentage nearly doubles to 
11.8% in the few Japanese companies that have opted for Companies 
with Committees). In contrast, 59.4% of companies include serving 
stakeholders as a fundamental objective of corporate governance and 
26.9% acknowledge the importance of corporate social responsibility. 
 
 
                                                 
 52. 2011 TSE-LISTED COMPANIES WHITE PAPER, supra note 50, at 3. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
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Table 7: The Underlying Concepts of Corporate Governance 
 
Japanese companies, while resistant to the stakeholder value philosophy, 
recognize to a greater degree other vital functions of corporate govern-
ance. Table 7 shows a significant number of companies recognized that 
monitoring and supervision (38.4%), execution (38.8%), decision mak-
ing (39.5%), internal control (18.8%), efficiency (20%), and soundness 
(23.5%) are part of the purpose of corporate governance. The imperative 
for accountability is recognized to be very important by Japanese com-
panies with 40.2% emphasizing compliance and 69% stating transparen-
cy as the key element (the highest scoring corporate purpose). It does 
appear that Japanese companies recognize the importance of accounta-
bility, but accountability to whom? 
Though Japanese corporate executives could be accused of not only 
guarding their corporations but also their own powerful and high-status 
positions in the corporations, they are certainly not defending high re-
wards relative to their executive counterparts overseas. Traditionally, and 
up to the present day, Japanese executives earn a fraction of the com-
pensation awarded to the senior executives of U.S. and European corpo-
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rations, and this has long been recognized as problem when Japanese 
corporations operate overseas or acquire foreign corporations. One stark 
example reported in the Wall Street Journal was that when Mitsubishi 
UFJ Financial Group (MUFG), Japan’s largest bank by market capitali-
zation, acquired a 21% stake in Morgan Stanley in 2008, MUFG paid a 
total of $8.1 million to its top fourteen executives in the previous fiscal 
year, while Morgan Stanley had paid CEO John Mack alone five times 
this amount, a total of $41.4 million in 2006. It has to be appreciated that 
at that time, MUFG was helping to rescue Morgan Stanley from the rav-
ages of the global financial crisis, not the other way around.
56
 For CEOs 
of very large corporations earning over $10 billion in annual revenues, 
the compensation package of fixed salary, performance-based pay, and 
stock options is approximately $10 million in the United States, about $6 
million in Europe, but a little over $1 million in Japan.
57
 
 
Figure 3: International Comparison of Executive Remuneration      
2010 in $ millions. Large Listed Corporations with over $10 billion        
in Annual Revenues
58
 
 
As Table 8 reveals, the level of compensation for executive direc-
tors of all listed companies and for directors of Top 200 companies by 
market capitalization in Japan is modest relative to their contemporaries 
overseas and similarly modest for board members. This lends support to 
the belief that in Japan, both for executives and boards, it is the enduring 
                                                 
 56. Yuka Hayashi & Phred Dvorak, Japanese Wrestle with CEO Pay As They Go Global, 
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 28, 2008, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1227823622285623 
81.html. 
 57. See Figure 3. 
 58. Nakanishi & Seki, supra note 29. 
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success of the corporation that is paramount, rather than the accumula-
tion of great personal wealth. This is an admirable aspect of Japanese 
corporate governance. Meanwhile, the boards of Western corporations 
devote increasing time and resources on devising increasingly elaborate 
executive performance incentives, which arguably could be claimed to 
prove a recurrent source of goal displacement from the strategic objec-
tives of the corporation towards the tactical reward of the executives 
concerned. 
 
Table 8: Level of Japanese Executive Remuneration
59
            
Annual Compensation in Yen millions* 
 
 All Listed Companies 
(circa 3,500) 
Top 200+ Companies 
by Market Capitalisation 
Directors 21.4 38.5 
Of Whom Are               
Outside 
3.5 7.6 
Audit & Supervisory 
Board Members 
     9.1     20.6 
Of Whom Are Outside 2.3 2.6 
*Amount in million yen divided by 100 to obtain approximate U.S. dollar      
equivalent. 
VII. THE CONTINUING RELEVANCE OF BERLE AND MEANS 
In many ways, the reform of Japanese corporate governance is fol-
lowing a path navigated previously by Anglo-American corporate gov-
ernance but encountering significant institutional barriers from a system 
in which different corporate values and definitions of business purpose 
exist. The question left unanswered is whether Japan may negotiate a 
more acceptable route to integrating accountability to shareholders and 
responsibility to wider stakeholders. Japan is presently living and work-
ing through economic debates concerning corporate purpose and ac-
countability, initiated by Berle and Means, the resolution of which will 
determine the future direction of Japanese corporations. 
Berle and Means typified the modern U.S. corporation that emerged 
in the early part of the last century as manifesting a separation of owner-
ship and control where professional managers were in a position to de-
                                                 
 59. Id. 
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termine the direction of the enterprise, and shareholders had “surrendered 
a set of definite rights for a set of indefinite expectations.”60 After the 
New Deal and the end of the Second World War, many U.S. corporations 
in the 1950s and 1960s increased massively in scale and market domina-
tion, achieving preeminent positions in world markets. 
A new managerial and corporate mode of coordination of enterprise 
based on organization and planning had arrived as analyzed by Coase in 
1937 and later by Chandler in 1977, transcending the market.
61
 This was 
an era celebrated in Galbraith’s New Industrial State in which corporate 
growth and brand prestige apparently had displaced profit maximization 
as the ultimate goals of technocratic managers, as planning and admin-
istration in close cooperation with government had displaced market re-
lations as the primary corporate dynamic.
62
 In this technocratic milieu, 
the shareholder was “a passive and functionless figure, remarkable only 
in his capacity to share, without effort or even without appreciable risk, 
in the gains from the growth by which the techno-structure measures its 
success.”63 
The Galbraithian idyll began to disintegrate with the severe reces-
sion of 1973–1975, with the incapacity of U.S. corporations to compete 
effectively with Japanese and European products in key consumer mar-
ket sectors, and the push towards conglomerate formation by Wall Street, 
which was interested in managing multiple businesses by financial per-
formance. Subsequently, in successive waves, U.S. corporations were 
subjected to further financial imperatives, and in a curious inversion of 
priorities, financial interests overwhelmed the commitment to the pro-
duction of goods and services. Over time, “purely financial interests have 
increasingly asserted their influence over these hybridized giant corpora-
tions”64 
A fertile scene was set for Michael Jensen, his colleagues in the 
Business and Law Schools at Harvard, and the Chicago School of Eco-
nomics to develop a finance-based theory of corporate governance that 
was to envelop Anglo-American policy and practice. While agency the-
                                                 
 60. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY 277 (McMillan Co. 1933). 
 61. See generally R. H. COASE, The Nature of the Firm, ECONOMICA, Nov. 1937, at 386; 
ALFRED D. CHANDLER, Jr., THE VISIBLE HAND: MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN 
BUSINESS (Belknap Press ed., 1977). 
 62. DOUG HENWOOD, WALL STREET 259 (Verso 1998). 
 63. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 394 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 
1967). 
 64. HENWOOD, supra note 62, at 262. 
2014] Evolution of Corporate Governance in Japan 741 
 
ory and shareholder value were the most enduring principles of the Jen-
sen legacy, they were preceded and accompanied by other financial in-
novations including leveraged buy-outs, junk bonds, and “disgorging” 
free cash flow.
65
 For Jensen, “the stock market is always axiomatically 
the ultimate arbiter of social good.”66 However, the result of eliminating 
the free cash flow of companies in leveraged buy-outs and in loading up 
companies with debt left U.S. companies without capital to invest in re-
search and development at a time of increasing competition from over-
seas companies engaged in continuous product development.
67
 
This financial innovation amounted to Jensen as “the eclipse of the 
public corporation.”68 Jensen’s article received a robust response. Peter 
Róna, head of Schroder Bank in New York, maintained that by exclu-
sively privileging shareholder interests, Jensen preempted “thoughtful 
analysis of the very question that is at the heart of the issue—what 
should be the rights and privileges of shareholders . . . .”69 Róna ques-
tioned Jensen’s assumption that shareholders are better judges of capital 
projects than managers and corporate boards as an “ideologically in-
spired assertion [that] lacks empirical support.”70 The increasingly ag-
gressive market for corporate control in the United States in the 1970s 
and 1980s was not primarily efficiency-enhancing as Jensen maintained, 
and there was little support for the “‘inefficient management displace-
ment’ hypothesis.”71 
Japan followed a very different trajectory than the United States in 
the development of corporate governance, finance, and strategy in the 
second half of the twentieth century. At the height of the Japanese eco-
nomic miracle in the 1980s, Western corporations constantly were urged 
to emulate the successful management of their Japanese counterparts 
with whom they apparently could not compete. With a keen focus on 
product development, high quality, and growth in market share for the 
long-term, Japanese corporations turbo-charged their way to market 
dominance in major sectors of Western economies in the 1970s and 
                                                 
 65. See generally William Lazonick, Controlling the Market for Corporate Control: The His-
torical Significance of Managerial Capitalism, 1 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 445 (1992). 
 66. HENWOOD, supra note 62, at 269. 
 67. See generally THE DEAL DECADE: WHAT TAKEOVERS AND LEVERAGED BUYOUTS MEAN 
FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Margaret M. Blair ed., 1993). 
 68. See generally Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. BUS. REV., 
Sept.–Oct. 1989, at 61 (emphasis in original). 
 69. Peter Róna, Letter to the Editor, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.–Dec. 1989, at 198. 
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 71. David J. Ravenscraft & Frederic M. Scherer, The Profitability of Mergers, 7 INT’L J. INDUS. 
ORG. 101, 105 (1989). 
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1980s. Japan maintained a much higher rate of GDP growth than West-
ern economies from the 1960s through 1990, and rivaled the United 
States in GDP per capita in the 1990s even after the Japanese speculative 
bubble had burst. Japan has retained a current account surplus, which in 
2010 was $196 billion, compared to the United States’ current account 
deficit of $471 billion.
72
 The Japanese economic miracle inspired (and 
invested in) the rapid economic development of the East Asian econo-
mies. 
For Lazonick, the combination of stable shareholding, permanent 
employment, and main-bank lending had placed Japanese executives in a 
unique position to guide the strategic direction of their companies during 
the period of the Japanese economic miracle: 
Stable shareholding has ensured that salaried managers who were 
committed to the growth of their companies, and who understood 
the technological, market, and competitive conditions in their par-
ticular industries, would have the power to allocate the firm’s re-
sources to those investments in products and processes with, ac-
cording to their judgment, innovative potential. The exercise of 
strategic control by salaried managers has not meant that the in-
vestment strategies that they have chosen have always been suc-
cessful. It has meant, however, that people who have had the power 
to determine a firm’s investment strategy are those who have under-
stood the technological, market, and competitive uncertainties that 
had to be overcome for a particular investment strategy to suc-
ceed.
73
 
The immense success of the Japanese export drive and the vast revenues 
earned overseas helped fuel a speculative bubble in property, equity, and 
other investments, supported by a pliant financial system, that ultimately 
unwound. The bursting of the Japanese bubble in the early 1990s coin-
cided with the revival of the U.S. economy around software industries in 
the 1990s and finance in the 2000s. The “lost decade” of the 1990s was a 
time of critical reflection about the Japanese economy. It is argued that 
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Japanese economic institutions were well suited for both postwar recon-
struction and “catching up” with other advanced economies, but not  
surpassing them.
74
 Japan essentially completed its “catch up” by the late 
1980s. The business–government cooperation and bank-centered corpo-
rate governance that served Japan well for decades was now ill suited in 
critical ways to guide Japan further forward, it was claimed. Yet these 
institutions continued with an inertia that reduced Japan’s ability to find 
and invest in new economic opportunities, including new enterprises. If 
equity markets are to play a fuller role in the dismantling of in-
ter-corporate equity holdings, systems need more transparent corporate 
decision making and corporate governance that is more responsive to 
shareholder pressure.
75
 
VIII. THE ONGOING GOVERNANCE DEBATE IN JAPAN 
The arrival of shareholder value and a market for corporate control 
gives rise to a tension in Japan between the concept of the company as a 
community and the company as property: 
On one side was ‘traditional’ Japanese corporate governance, char-
acterised [sic] by features such as the power of internally promoted 
management to run large, listed companies with minimal external 
supervision, concern with the company as a continuing community, 
and a lack of direct attention to shareholder interests. On the other 
side was the view that in order to restore the national economy to 
good health, Japanese business needed to adhere to an emerging 
global consensus in corporate governance.
76
 
In the past, the growing contrast between the United States’ emphasis on 
shareholder value and the Japanese indifference to shareholder rights was 
observed but had few practical implications because the two systems had 
few opportunities to impact one another. Although there were some ear-
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lier incidents with T. Boone Pickens, who acquired 25% of the shares in 
the automotive parts company Koito Manufacturing but failed to secure a 
seat on the board, and other Western investors who were often dismissed 
as adventurers, the more recent emergence of hedge fund activism in Ja-
pan provided the context for a classic contest of governance principles: 
“American activist hedge funds were often confrontational investors who 
targeted companies which they believed were squandering shareholder 
value.”77 
This strategy proved successful for U.S. hedge funds in generating 
above-market rates of return for the funds and their own investors, and 
they turned to other markets in Europe and in Japan hoping to release 
value from the cash and assets of conservatively managed corporations. 
“In Japan, the approach of the funds came into immediate conflict with 
the idea and practice of the community firm that still retained widespread 
support . . . .”78 
As the drive for change in Japanese corporate governance acceler-
ates, fundamental questions are asked in Japan similar to those posed by 
Berle and Means: “Whose interests should a company serve? Is it the 
property of shareholders, for them to do whatever they want with it, or 
does it have a wider social purpose?”79 This amounted to a contest of 
principles between U.S. hedge funds and Japanese corporations: 
Managers of the targeted companies, for their part, had little interest 
in shareholder value; they barely understood what the words meant. 
What mattered to them, and what constituted ‘corporate value’ in 
their view, was not the share price or any other financial measure, 
but the ability of the company to prosper and to grow over the long 
term.
80
 
A philosophical divide of significant dimensions separated the Japanese 
executives determinedly committed to the long-term development of 
their companies from overseas investors committed to securing what 
they perceived as their right to increase shareholder value: 
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What followed was a tournament of corporate governance beliefs. 
Activist hedge funds, often of foreign origin, but sometimes Japa-
nese, used the formal legal rights conferred on shareholders by Jap-
anese company law and by companies’ own articles of association 
to mount a fundamental challenge to the core of management prac-
tice in the community firm. In doing so, they drew out into the open 
a range of issues that had previously been uncontroversial concern-
ing managerial autonomy and accountability, the balance in divi-
dend policy between the distribution of income and the accumula-
tion of reserves, and the optimal level of financial gearing for com-
panies.
81
 
In recent years notable takeover jousts have occurred—a foretaste per-
haps of larger battles to come. In 2007, when activist fund Steel Partners 
attempted to acquire Bull-Dog Food Company, Bull-Dog adopted a de-
fense strategy and amended its articles of incorporation to allow its 
shareholders the power to issue free stock-acquisition rights for each 
owned share, with the intention to reduce the shareholding of Steel. Steel 
claimed this was illegal, but the Tokyo High Court ruled the U.S. hedge 
fund an “abusive acquirer.” Steel had claimed the defensive measure in-
fringed the principle of shareholder equality under Article 109 of the 
Corporation Law and could be characterized as grossly unfair under Ar-
ticle 247 of the Corporation Law. An appeal by Steel to the Supreme 
Court did not succeed. “[T]he Supreme Court held that the discriminato-
ry treatment of a shareholder could not be deemed to contravene the 
principle of ‘shareholder equality’ where a shareholder was attempting a 
takeover and this could potentially damage the existence or development 
of the company.”82 
A similar contest between the British hedge fund The Children’s 
Investment Fund (TCI) in its intervention in J-Power demonstrated ag-
gressive tactics by activist investors not likely to succeed in Japan. When 
the Japanese government blocked TCI from its attempt to double its 
stake in J-Power to 20% as a potential threat to national security, TCI 
bought shares in two other major investors in J-Power. TCI called on 
other investors to support its demands of J-Power to raise dividends, ap-
point outside directors, and dismantle the web of crossholdings it main-
tained with other companies. 
A Financial Times report revealed the kinds of pressure companies 
face in Dividends to Reap: Shareholder Activists Begin to Make Their 
                                                 
 81. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 76, at 5. 
 82. KODATE & FUKUDA, supra note 14, at 261. 
746 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 37:717 
 
Mark in Japan, in which Toshikazu Nakanishi, chairman of Japan 
Shareholder Services argued, “Companies are no longer as certain of the 
loyalty of their shareholders as they have been . . . . The really positive 
thing that has come out of these developments is that the companies have 
become aware that they need to explain [their strategy] to shareholders.”83 
“The ‘content of conversation’ between managers and their Japa-
nese investors has changed,” claimed Eizo Tomimura, chief portfolio 
manager at Nissay Asset Management.
84
 “More companies are discuss-
ing return on equity and margins, where in the past they have focused on 
the size of the company and revenues.” Two years ago, when Mr. To-
mimura started investing in Japanese equities, he could not recall a com-
pany that had a policy of returning 100% of its free cash flow to share-
holders. He estimates that about 10% do so now.
85
 
Japanese companies are concerned that the new wave of sharehold-
er activism is similar to the greenmail they faced from T. Boone Pickens 
and others in the 1980s when it was assumed that overseas investors 
were more interested in extracting money from the companies they in-
vested in than seeing the businesses succeed into the future. Japanese 
executives are now worried activist investors are more interested in re-
lieving Japanese corporations of their substantial cash funds than their 
strategic futures.
86
 However, the Japanese system has become more 
shareholder friendly during this period and dialogue is taking place about 
higher standards of governance and accountability.
87
 But “[t]he survival 
of the company as an enduring organization still remains a more im-
portant consideration in Japan than the investors who happen to hold the 
shares at any given time.”88 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Japan has much to learn from the West about corporate governance, 
board leadership, directors’ duties, transparency, and accountability. 
Similarly, the West has much to learn from Japan about the conception 
of the corporation as a community, the sense of long-term business 
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strategy, and director and executive commitment to enduring business 
success.
89
 In the West, the conception of fiduciary duty is often con-
strained to the simple relationship between company directors and 
shareholders (agents and principals). Conversely, in Japan, there is a 
deeper sense of the communal nature of fiduciary duty as: 
1. Employees are answerable to Managers. 
2. Managers are answerable to Executives. 
3. Executives are answerable to Directors. 
4. Directors are answerable to Shareholders. 
5. Shareholders are answerable to Employees.90 
 
Simon Learmount recently discussed the development of the power bal-
ance in Japanese corporations and suggests there is a more social process 
of accountability in Japan than in the United States.
91
 This social ac-
countability includes closer accountability of Japanese managers to em-
ployees and highlights the accountabilities of investment institutions to 
their own constituencies of ultimate owners and beneficiaries, central 
among whom are the employees of the corporations that institutions in-
vest in. What is required is a better understanding between companies 
and institutional investors, and while calling for the accountability of 
corporations, investment institutions should be aware of their own ac-
countabilities to ultimate beneficiaries. Yet, as in other economies, Japa-
nese company directors find it increasingly difficult to establish rela-
tionships with short-term investors. 
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